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In this paper, we look at structural change, and in particular at the shrinking size
of manufacturing in favor of the service sector, as one additional source of decline in
the wage share. To the purpose, we build on Dutt (1988) to develop a two-sector
Kaleckian model of growth and distribution, where the economy consists of the service
and manufacturing sectors. The service good is only used for consumption while the
manufacturing good is used both for consumption and accumulation of the capital stock.
We assume that structural change is exogenous as it arises from a shift in consumers'
preferences. We show that, when mark-ups are relatively higher in the service sector, a
shift in the sectoral composition of demand in favor of the service sector good generates
a rise in the proﬁt share. The unique (non-trivial) steady state is asymptotically stable.
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1 Introduction
At the onset of modern growth theory, Kaldor (1961) suggested that long-run stability of
factors income shares is one of the main 'stylized facts' of market economies. Yet, recent
contributions (Jayadev and Rodriguez , 2013; Karabarbounis and Neiman , 2014; OECD
, 2015) have shown that the labor share has declined over the past three decades in both
developed and developing countries. While the possibility of short- and medium-run ﬂuctu-
ations in factors shares has long been acknowledged (Bentolila and Saint-Paul , 2003; Young
, 2004), the prolonged decline in labor share seems to point to either a long-run negative
trend in the labor share or a shift to a lower steady state wage share as more plausible
descriptions of the evidence.
Several explanations for such a trend have been put forward and investigated both from
theoretical and empirical standpoints. Economists working within the neoclassical frame-
work have emphasized the importance of the shape of production function and the nature of
technical change in determining factors shares trends. As is well known, a unitary elasticity
of substitution (σ) between capital and labor, that is a Cobb-Douglas production function,
necessarily implies constant factors shares. There are two possibilities to obtain a fall in the
labor share: either capital deepening (in eﬃciency terms) when labor and capital are substi-
tutes (σ > 1), or a reduction in the capital-labor ratio when the elasticity of substitution is
less than one. Piketty and Zucman (2014) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) support
the ﬁrst mechanism; but while Piketty and Zucman (2014) attributes capital deepening to
negative shocks to the (exogenous) growth rate, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) ﬁnd its
determinant in the decline of the price of investment goods relative to consumption goods.
Acemoglu (2003) analyzes the second possibility in the context of induced technical change,
though he only applies it to deviations from the stable steady state wage share.
Other researchers (Berthold et al., 2002; Bental and Demougin , 2010; Checchi and
García-Peñalosa , 2010) have investigated the relation between changes in labor market
institutions and the labor share trend. Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2010), in particular,
show that a reduction in unions' bargaining power might have played a role in reducing the
share of income accruing to workers.
Multiple elements of globalization have also been singled out as factors behind the falling
labor share. They range from trade (Brock and Dobbelaere , 2006; Doan and Wan , 2017),
to oﬀshoring (Elsby et al. , 2013), to capital account openess (Jayadev , 2007).
Finally, economists working withing the Post-Keynesian tradition (Dünhaupt , 2017;
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Stockhammer , 2017) have looked at the increasing size of the ﬁnancial sector as an additional
determinant of the decline in the wage share.
Relatively little attention, on the other hand, has been paid to the possible inﬂuence
of structural change on functional income distribution. De Serres et al. (2001) show that
changes in the sectoral structure of the economy help explaining the trend decline in the
aggregate wage share observed in ﬁve European countries and in the US over the 1980s
and 1990s. From a theoretical point of view, a recent paper by Alvarez-Cuadrado et al.
(2018) explains the decline in the labor share in a two sector neoclassical growth model,
where sectoral diﬀerences in productivities growth and factors' elasticities of substitution,
and non-homotethic preferences produce an endogenous rise in the service sector relative
to manufacturing. Their quantitative analysis shows that within-industries income shares
dynamics rather than changes in the sectoral composition of output is mostly responsible
for the fall in the aggregate wage share.
In this paper, we investigate the relation between structural change and functional in-
come distribution within the Kaleckian theory of growth and distribution. We build on Dutt
(1988) and Dutt (1990) to develop a two-sector Kaleckian model of growth and distribu-
tion, where the economy consists of the service and manufacturing sectors. The service good
is only used for consumption while the manufacturing good is used both for consumption
and the accumulation of capital stock. We assume that structural change is exogenous as it
arises from shifts in consumers' preferences and in the saving rate. We study two versions of
the model, with and without proﬁt rates equalization across sector. Under both speciﬁca-
tions we show that, when mark-ups are relatively higher in the service sector, a shift in the
sectoral composition of demand in favor of the service sector generates a rise in the steady
state proﬁt share. The unique (non-trivial) steady state equilibrium is asymptotically stable.
The crucial assumption that mark-ups are relatively higher in the service sector is motivated
by recent empirical evidence. In particular, Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2018) analyze a set
of seventeen industrialized countries between 1970 and 2007, and they show that the labor
share in the manufacturing sector is consistently higher than in the service sector.
While seminal contributions by Dutt (1988, 1990); Park (1995); Dutt (1997); Lavoie and
Ramirez-Gaston (1997); Franke (2000) laid the foundations of the two-sectors Keynesian-
Kaleckian model growth and distribution, recent papers have generalized the model to inves-
tigate additional issues. Nishi (2018) analyzes the eﬀects of introducing sectoral endogenous
labor productivity growth on cyclical demand, growth and distribution. Fujita (2018) ex-
plores how changes in sectoral mark-ups aﬀect sectoral and aggregate capacity utilization
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and capital accumulation. Murakami (2018) studies the eﬀect of sectoral interactions on
business cycles in a Keynesian model, without focusing on income distribution. None of
these recent contributions, however, consider the role that changes in demand composition
may produce on income distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and states the
theoretical results; Section 3 oﬀer some concluding remarks while proofs of the propositions
can be found in Section 4.
2 The Model
2.1 Production and technology
The economy consists of the service good (s) and the manufacturing good (m). Output in
both sectors (Xi) is produced through a sector-speciﬁc Leontief production function:
Xi = min[uiBiKi, AiLi], i = s,m (1)
where B and A are capital and labor productivities, K is the capital stock, L is em-
ployment, and u is the degree of capacity utilization. We assume no depreciation of capital.
Proﬁt maximization ensures:
Xi = uiBiKi = AiLi. (2)
2.2 Society and preferences
There are two classes in society. Workers supply labor services and receive the wage rate w,
uniform across sectors. They consume their whole income. Capitalists earn proﬁts on the
capital stock they own. Their propensity to save is s > 0.1 Workers and capitalists share the
same preferences, which are deﬁned over the two goods. We assume that individual utility
of agent j is:
Uj(cs, cm) = min[cs, αcm],
where ci is consumption of good i, and α > 0. The ﬁxed coeﬃcient structure of prefer-
1We denote by s both the service sector and the saving rate. Given context no ambiguity should arise.
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ences implies cs = αcm. The same ﬁxed proportion carries over to total demand:
Cs ≡
∑
j
cs =
∑
j
αcm = α
∑
j
cm ≡ αCm. (3)
2.3 Mark-up prices
In line with the original Kaleckian literature, we assume that ﬁrms set prices by charging
a constant mark-up (zi) over unit labor cost. Mark-ups are sector speciﬁc and our crucial
hypothesis is that they are relatively higher in the service sector, as this sector is less open
to competition. If we let pi be the price of good i, and we choose the service sector good as
the numerarie we have ps = 1 = (1 + zs)w/As and pm ≡ p = (1 + zm)w/Am, with zs > zm.
Accordingly
w =
As
1 + zs
, (4)
p =
1 + zm
1 + zs
As
Am
. (5)
2.4 Value added distribution
In each sector, value added is distributed as wages and proﬁts to labor and capital employed
in production. If we let ri be the interest rate in sector i we have piXi = wLi + ripmKi,
which, after using (2), (4), (5) and rearranging, yields
rs =
zs
1 + zm
Am
As
usBs, (6)
and
rm =
zm
1 + zm
umBm. (7)
2.5 Output uses
The service good is only used for consumption so that Xs = Cs. In what follows, it will be
useful to distinguish consumption depending on its income source. We denote consumption
out of wages as Cwi , and consumption out of proﬁts as C
pi
i , so that
Xs = Cs = C
w
s + C
pi
s . (8)
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Manufacturing output, on the contrary is used both for consumption and for investment (I)
in the service and in the manufacturing sectors:
Xm = Cm + I. (9)
2.6 Balanced growth under alternative closures
The discussion between Park (1995) and Dutt (1997) on the risk of overdetermination
in the Kaleckian two sector growth model clariﬁed that there are two possible consistent
speciﬁcations of the model. In the ﬁrst one, there is no sectoral capital mobility in the short
run, so that Ks and Km are given; we can specify sectoral growth rates, and proﬁt rates
will not be equalized unless by a ﬂuke. The second version of the model assumes that the
stock of capital moves between sectors to equate sectoral proﬁt rates in the short run; in
this framework, since the sectoral capital stocks are not state variables we can only specify
the aggregate growth rate, rather than the sectoral ones.2 We analyze the two speciﬁcations
of the model in turn, and we show that the qualitative results on income distribution and
structural change are independent of the model closure.
2.6.1 The model without proﬁt rates equalization
Since workers do not save, the whole wage fund is spent as consumption out of wages. Using
(3) and (2) we have
Cwm + C
w
s = C
w
s /α+ C
w
s = w(Ls + Lm) = w
(
usBsKs
As
+
umBmKm
Am
)
.
Hence, factorizing Cws and substituting for the wage rate from (4) yields
Cws =
α
1 + α
As
1 + zs
(
usBsKs
As
+
umBmKm
Am
)
=
α
1 + α
1
1 + zs
(usBsKs + γumBmKm) ,
(10)
where γ ≡ As/Am.
On the other hand, capitalists' propensity to consume out of proﬁts (Π) is (1 − s).
Accordingly
2A variant of this version of the model assumes that proﬁt rates equalization is a slow process. Sectoral
capital stocks are given and sectoral investment depends on the proﬁt rates diﬀerential. We explore this
variant in the stability analysis.
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Cpim + C
pi
s = C
pi
s /α+ C
pi
s = (1− s) (rmpKm + rspKs) ,
which, using (5),(6) and (7) implies
Cpis =
α
1 + α
1− s
1 + zs
(zsusBsKs + zmγumBmKm) .
Once we know consumption out of wages and proﬁts in the service sector we can use
equation (8) to ﬁnd
Xs =
α
1 + α
1
1 + zs
(usBsKs(1 + (1− s)zs) + γumBmKm(1 + (1− s)zm)) .
Deﬁne δ ≡ Ks/K ∈ [0, 1] as the share of the capital stock employed in the service sector,
to be determined in equilibrium. Dividing both sides of the previous equation by K and
rearranging yields
δusBs = (1− δ)umBmγα(1 + (1− s)zm)
1 + zs(1 + αs)
≡ (1− δ)umBmγΓ(α, s). (11)
It is easy to show that Γ is a positive function of α and negative of s, when zs > zm. Let
us now turn to the equilibrium in the manufacturing sector. If we let gi be the growth
rate of sector i, under the assumption of no sectoral capital mobility, equation (9) becomes
Xm = Cs/α + gmKm + gsKs = Xs/α + gmKm + gsKs, where we used (3). Using factors
demand found in (2), and dividing both sides by K, the previous condition becomes
umBm(1− δ) = usBsδ/α+ gm(1− δ) + gsδ. (12)
The Kaleckian tradition posits that investment depends on utilization of capacity as a
measure of aggregate demand. In our case, the actual growth rate of capital in each sector
(gi) is a function of the sector's degree of capacity utilization:
gm = gm(um), (13)
and
gs = gs(us). (14)
7
Finally, balanced growth requires that sectoral growth rates be equalized
gm = gs. (15)
We have a consistent system of ﬁve equations, (11),(12),(13),(14) and (15), in the ﬁve
unknowns δ, um, us, gm, gs. Our focus is on income distribution. The proﬁt share pi is the
ratio between the value of total proﬁts and value added. We can use (2), (5), (6), (7), (11)
to calculate its equilibrium value
pi∗ =
rspKs + rmpKm
Xs + pXm
= p
rsδ + rm(1− δ)
δusBs + (1− δ)pumBm =
p
1 + zm
usδ/γ + zmum(1− δ)
δusBs + (1− δ)pumBm =
zsΓ(α, s) + zm
(1 + zs)Γ(α, s) + (1 + zm)
. (16)
Inspection of (16) shows that pi∗ is economically meaningful being bounded between zero
and one. It is a function of the sectoral mark-ups, consumers' preferences between the two
consumption goods, and the saving rate.
We are now in a position to state:
Proposition 1. an increase in consumption demand of the service good relative to the
manufacturing good (a rise in α) raises the equilibrium proﬁt share.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2. a decrease in the saving rate raises the equilibrium proﬁt share.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In both Proposition 1 and 2 the rise in the proﬁt share follows the increase in Γ due to
shocks to α and s. In order to understand the economic meaning of an increase in Γ we
can re-write equation (11) as Xs/(Xmγ) = Ls/Lm = Γ(α, s). When Γ rises, employment in
the service sector rises relative to the manufacturing one. Given labor producitivities and
sectoral mark-ups, the change in relative employment carries over into relative sectoral value
added. Therefore, the increase in the proﬁt share depends on the change in the composition
of production in favor of the sector with higher mark-up, which can be caused either by
a change in consumers' preferences or by a reduction in the saving rate. Contrary to the
standard one sector Kaleckian growth model, the proﬁt share depends on savings.
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2.6.2 The model with proﬁt rates equalization
In the second version of the model, sectoral capital stocks are not state variables since capital
adjusts in the short run to ensure proﬁt rates equalization. Accordingly, there are no sectoral
growth rates and we need to replace equation (12) with
umBm(1− δ) = usBsδ/α+ g. (17)
Equation (11) is not aﬀected by the new closure, whereas we need to drop (13) and
(14) and replace them with a single equation for the growth rate of capital. We assume it
depends on the degree of capacity utilization in both sectors:
g = g(us,um). (18)
Next, we impose the equalization of proﬁt rates across sectors, so that rs = ru. Using (6)
and (7), the equalization yields:
us =
As
Am
zm
zs
Bm
Bs
um. (19)
We now have a consistent system of four equations, (11),(17),(18) and (19), in the four
unknowns δ, um, us, g. In particular, use (19) into (11) to ﬁnd
δ∗ =
Γ(α, s)
Γ(α, s) + zm/zs
. (20)
Let us now turn to the proﬁt share:
pi∗ =
rspKs + rmpKm
Xs + pXm
=
rp
δusBs + (1− δ)pumBm =
=
zm
(1− δ) ((1 + zs) Γ(α, s) + 1 + zm) =
zsΓ(α, s) + zm
(1 + zs)Γ(α, s) + (1 + zm)
, (21)
where we used the equalization of proﬁt rates, (2), (5), (6), (7), (11), and (20). Equations
(13) and (21) show that the ﬁnal expression for the proﬁt share is the same irrespective of
the model closure; therefore, a shift of consumers' preferences in favor of the service sector
and a decrease in the saving rate bring about an increase in the proﬁt share, whether we
assume proﬁt rates equalization or not.
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2.7 Stability
We now turn to the stability analysis of the balanced growth path. In the model with proﬁt
rate equalization, however, the adjustment to the balanced growth equilibrium is instanta-
neous and there is no transitional dynamics. In order to introduce a dynamic adjustment
in this version of the model, we assume that sectoral proﬁt rates are diﬀerent in the short
run, but changes in sectoral investment bring about proﬁt rates equalization in the long run.
This is the process known as 'classical competition'. After this modiﬁcation, the dynamics
of the economy in both models is described by the slow adjustment in the the allocation of
capital between sectors. To the purpose, we derive a diﬀerential equation for δ, the share of
capital employed in the service sector. Given the deﬁnition of δ, taking time derivative and
rearranging yields
δ˙ = δ(1− δ)(gs − gm). (22)
2.7.1 The model without proﬁt rate equalization
In order to study the dynamic behavior of δ, we start by assuming explicit functional forms
for sectoral growth rates. Equations (13) and (14) become
gs = ϑ0 + ϑ1us (23)
and
gm = β0 + β1um. (24)
We can use the two previous equations together with (11) and (12) to solve for utilization
rates as functions of δ :
us(δ) =
γΓ(α, s)
BsΘ
(
β0
1− δ
δ
+ ϑ0
)
(25)
and
um(δ) =
(
β0 + ϑ0
δ
1− δ
)
/Θ, (26)
where Θ = [1− (β1 + γΓ(α, s)(ϑ1/Bs + 1/α))]. Notice that economically meaningful
(positive) solutions for um and us require Θ > 0, that is (β1 + γΓ(α, s)(ϑ1/Bs + 1/α)) < 1.
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This condition is the equivalent of the standard Keynesian 'stability' condition in one-sector
Kaleckain growth models, which states that investment need be less responsive than saving to
economic activity. β1 and ϑ1 represent how sectoral invesment reacts to capacity utilization;
the role of saving is captured by Γ(α, s), which is a negative function of the saving rate.
We can rewrite (22) as
δ˙ = δ(1− δ) [gs(δ)− gm(δ)] ,
and state
Proposition 3. The system has two locally unstable trivial steady states at δ = 0 and δ = 1.
The system has one non-trivial steady state δ∗, which is asymptotically stable for δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. see the Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that if the intial condition of the system is such that both sector
exist, the economy will converge towards the non- trivial steady state. If, on the other hand,
the economy consists of only one sector at the beginning of time, the two-sector structure
will never appear. Notice, however, that δ = 1 does not have economic meaning because
there cannot be accumulation of capital without production of the manufacturing good.
When δ = 0, we are back to the standard one-sector model, where the only output is used
for both consumption and investment.
2.7.2 The model with proﬁt rates equalization
In order to introduce a dynamic adjustment in this version of the model, we assume that
proﬁt rates equalization is not instantaneous. Sectoral proﬁt rates are diﬀerent in the short
run, but changes in sectoral investment bring about proﬁt rates equalization in the long run.
We follow Dutt (1997) in assuming that the diﬀerence in sectoral growth rates depends on
the proﬁt rates diﬀerential
gs − gm = λ(rs − rm), λ > 0. (27)
On the other hand, ﬁrms choose the total rate of invesment based on the average degree
of capacity utilization in the economy u¯. Assuming a linear form for the investment function
we have:
g = g(u¯) = µ0 + µ1u¯, (28)
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where
u¯ =
Xs + pXm
pK
=
1 + zm
1 + zs
usδBs
γ
+ um(1− δ)Bm.
We can now use (11), (17), (6), (7) and (28) to solve for sectoral proﬁt rates as functions
of δ :
rs(δ) =
zs
1 + zm
1
γ
Bsus(δ) =
zs
1 + zm
µ0
Ψ
1
δ
, (29)
and
rm(δ) =
zm
1 + zm
Bmum(δ) =
zm
1 + zm
µ0
Ψ
1
1− δ , (30)
where Ψ =
[
1− γΓ(α, s)/α− µ1
(
1 + 1+zm1+zs Γ(α, s)
)]
. Economically meaningful (posi-
tive) solutions for rm and rs require Ψ > 0. Similarly to the previous case, we can interpret
it as the equivalent of the standard Keynesian 'stability' condition in one-sector Kaleckian
growth models. Using the latest results and (27) in (22) we ﬁnd
δ˙ = λδ(1− δ) [rs(δ)− rm(δ).] (31)
We can state
Proposition 4. The system has two locally unstable trivial steady states at δ = 0 and δ = 1.
The non trivial steady state δ∗ = Γ(α,s)Γ(α,s)+zm/zs is asymptotically stable over δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Similarly to the comparative dynamics results found in Proposition 1 and 2, the com-
parison between Proposition 3 and 4 show that the stability properties of the model are
independent of the model closure.
3 Conclusions
Evidence on the process of structural change shows that the share of the service sector in
the total economy tends to rise as countries become richer (Herrendorf et al. , 2014). Since,
as documented in Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2018), the wage share in the service sector is
relatively low, growth and structural tranformation in mature economies necessarily bring
about a reduction in the aggregate wage share, absent mitigating factors. As a consequence,
changes in the composition of output and employment across sectors should be taken into ac-
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count when investigating the ongoing negative trend in the wage share in most industrialized
countries.
This paper has adopted the Kaleckian two-sector growth model of growth and distribu-
tion to analyze this process. We have shown that there is one (non trivial) unique asymptot-
ically stable balanced growth path. The steady state functional income distribution depends
on the composition of output, which, in turn, changes with consumers' preferences over the
two consumption goods and with the saving rate. When the size of the service sector rises
the proﬁt share increases.
4 Appendix
4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
dpi∗
dα
=
(zs − zm)Γ′α(α, s)
((1 + zs)Γ(α, s) + (1 + zm)γ)
2 > 0,
since zs > z and Γ
′
α(α, s) =
α(1+(1−s)zm)(1+zs)
(1+zs(1+αs))
2 > 0.
4.2 Proof of Proposition 2
dpi∗
ds
=
(zs − zm)Γ′s(α, s)
((1 + zs)Γ(α, s) + (1 + zm)γ)
2 < 0,
since zs > z and Γ
′
s(α, s) =
−α(zm+αzs+zmzs(1+α))
(1+zs(1+αs))
2 < 0.
4.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Let us start with the two trivial steady state. Inspection of (22) shows that δ˙ = 0 at δ = 0,
and δ = 1. Turning to stability, we have d˙δdδ = (1−δ) [gs(δ)− gm(δ)]−δ [gs(δ)− gm(δ)]+δ(1−
δ) [g′s(δ)− g′m(δ)] . At δ = 0, gs(0) is not deﬁned but limδ→0 d˙δdδ = limδ→0 [gs(δ)− gm(δ)]→
∞ > 0, so that the ﬁrst trivial steady state is locally unstable. At δ = 1, gm(1) is not deﬁned
but limδ→1 d˙δdδ = limδ→1 − [gs(δ)− gm(δ)]→∞ > 0, so that the second trivial steady state
is locally unstable.Let us now to turn to prove the existence and stability of the non-trivial
steady state. Plug 25 and (26) into (22) to ﬁnd
δ˙ = δ(1− δ)
[
ϑ0 + ϑ1
γΓ(α,s)
BsΘ
(
β0
1−δ
δ + ϑ0
)− β0 − β1 (β0 + ϑ0 δ1−δ) /Θ]
= δ(1− δ)
[
ϑ0 − β0 + ϑ1 γΓ(α,s)BsΘ ϑ0 − β1β0/Θ
]
+(1− δ)2ϑ1 γΓ(α,s)BsΘ β0 − δ2β1ϑ0/Θ
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= δ2(K2 −K1 −K3) + δ(K1 − 2K2) +K2, where K1 = ϑ0 − β0 + ϑ1 γΓ(α,s)BsΘ ϑ0 − β1β0/Θ,
K2 = ϑ1
γΓ(α,s)
BsΘ
β0, and K3 = β1ϑ0/Θ. Therefore δ˙(δ) is a quadratic function. As a ﬁrst step,
notice that δ˙(0) = K2 > 0, and δ˙(1) = −K3 < 0. Since δ˙ is continuous, over the domain
δ ∈ [0, 1], it must cross the horizontal axis from above at least once in order to move from
positive to negative values, according to Bolzano's theorem for continuous functions deﬁned
over a compact set. In principle, there could be a second root since the function is quadratic,
but that cannot be the case or there would need to be a third real root for the function to
approach a negative value as δ → 1. Therefore, for δ ∈ (0, 1) there can only be one steady
state δ∗. It is asymptoticall stable as δ˙ < 0 for δ > δ∗ and δ˙ > 0 for δ < δ∗.
4.4 Proof of proposition 4
The analysis of two trivial steady states is analogous to the proof of proposition 3. Inspection
of (31) shows that δ˙ = 0 at δ = 0 and δ = 1. Turning to stability, we have d˙δdδ = λ(1 −
δ) [rs(δ)− rm(δ)]−λδ [rs(δ)− rm(δ)]+λδ(1−δ) [r′s(δ)− r′m(δ)] . At δ = 0, rs(0) is not deﬁned
but limδ→0 d˙δdδ = limδ→0 [rs(δ)− rm(δ)] → ∞ > 0, so that the ﬁrst trivial steady state is
locally unstable. At δ = 1, rm(1) is not deﬁned but limδ→1 d˙δdδ = limδ→1− [rs(δ)− rm(δ)]→
∞ > 0, so that the second trivial steady state is locally unstable.
Let us now to turn to prove stability of the non-trivial steady state. ∀δ ∈ (0, 1) we
have dδ˙/dδ = − λ1+zm
µ0
Ψ δ(1 − δ)
(
zs
Γ(α,s)
α
1
δ2
−+z 1
(1−δ)2
)
< 0. Hence δ∗ = Γ(α,s)Γ(α,s)+zm/zs is
asymptotically stable over ∀δ ∈ (0, 1).
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